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THE PENNSYLVANIA GOODS AND SERVICES




The affluence of American society with its increasingly high
standard of living and the consumption orientation of its citizenry
is a well known fact. To an apparently ever-increasing extent
this affluence rests on consumer credit. The attitudes of Amer-
icans toward debt have undergone a remarkable change in the
twentieth century. "Whereas not too long ago, debt was viewed
as the mark of an imprudent or poverty-stricken man, today it is
part of the American way of life."' Indicative of the phenomenal
growth of consumer credit is the fact that since 1945 it has in-
creased at a growth rate more than four times that of the econ-
omy as a whole.2 Although such credit accounted for only $5.6
billion in 1945, 3 by the end of 1971 it totalled $135 billion.4 An
increasingly important part of this spending is charge account
credit. In 1963 charge account credit was less than $6 billion,'
1. Caplovitz, Consumer Credit in the Affluent Society, 33 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 641 (1968).
2. H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1967). For a brief
historical treatment of the growth of installment credit, see I FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM BOARD OF GOVERNORS, CONSUMER INSTALLMENT CREDrr, vol.
1, at 22-24 (1957) [hereinafter cited as I FFDERAL RESERVE REPORT].
3. H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1967).
4. I DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ADVISORY COMmrrrEE REPORT, FI-
NANCING THE A-mii. CONSUMER, at 43 (1972).
5. 50 FED. RESERVE BULL. 376-77 (1964).
whereas by 1970 it amounted to $16.9, billion,6 the major portion
thereof being revolving credit charge accounts.
The above figures are pertinent to the legal system for two
reasons. First, the growth of consumer credit has occurred because
applicable law has permitted social and economic conditions to
produce it. Second, any defects in the applicable law are affect-
ing more and more Americans.7 In view of this all-pervasive in-
fluence on American society s a re-examination of the legal princi-
ples behind the law is in order. The purpose of this Comment will
be generally to examine those principles affecting revolving credit
charge accounts and specifically to examine Pennsylvania's regu-
lation of revolving charges under the Goods and Services Install-
ment Sales Act.9
I. THE REVOLVING CHARGE AccouNT
Contrary to popular opinion, the revolving charge account is
not of recent origin, 10 having grown out of the depression." Pres-
ently there are two types of credit card transactions: (1) bank
credit cards, and (2) department store credit cards. The bank
transaction involves three parties, namely the bank, the consumer,
and the merchant, whereas the department store plan involves
only the last two parties.
The fundamental operation of the revolving charge account
is the same in both transactions. In a typical case a consumer who
wishes to open a revolving charge account completes a credit ap-
plication form which contains, on the back side, the terms of the
charge account agreement.1 2 The consumer then signs the agree-
6. II DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ADVisoRY COMMITTEE REPORT, Fi-
NANCINa THE AMEP. CONSuMER, at 67 (1972).
7. Comment, Consumer Credit Symposium: Developments in the
Law, 55 Nw. U. L. REV. 301 (1960).
8. A national survey conducted in January 1967 showed that ninety-
three per cent of American households had used some form of installment
credit. Caplovitz, Consumer Credit in the Affluent Society, 33 LAw &
CONTEMP. PFOB. 641, 642 (1968).
9. PA. STAT. AN. tit. 69, §§ 1101-2303 (Supp. 1972).
10. For the historical background of the credit card see Davenport,
Bank Credit Cards and the Uniform Commercial Code, 1 VAL. L. REV. 218,
218-22 (1967); Comment, The Tripartite Credit Transaction: A Legal Infant,
48 CAIJx. L. REv. 459, 560-63 (1960). For the historical development of the
credit card in Pennsylvania see Comment, Bank Credit Card-The Service
Charge Problem, 77 DICK. L. REV. 139, 140-41 (1972).
11. Project, Legislative Regulation of Retail Installment Financing,
7 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 618, 642 (1960). This article presents the historical
progression of revolving charge accounts and distinguishes them from open
charge accounts and installment accounts. Id. at 642-44.
12. A representative example of a bank revolving charge account
agreement is the Bank Americard Application and Customer Payment
Schedule, Form 5635, which provides:
Finance Charge
On Purchases of Merchandise or Services
There is no finance charge if the total balance on your
Bank Americard account is paid within 25 days of the billing date.
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ment. After a credit investigation, the consumer generally is
approved for a limited amount of credit based on his financial sta-
The balance on which the finance charge may be imposed
(herein called 'Net Balance') is the previous month's balance less
payments and credits.
The amount of the FINANCE CHARGE may be determined
by multiplying the Net Balance by a periodic rate of 114% per
month, except that if the Net Balance is less than $40, a minimum
finance charge of 500 is imposed.
. The periodic rate of purchases corresponds to an ANNUAL
PERCENTAGE RATE OF 15%.
A representative example of a retail revolving charge account agreement
is the Montgomery Ward Agreement which provides:
MONTGOMERY WARD "CHARG-ALL" AND "CHARG-ALL PLUS" AGREEMENT: Mont-
gomery Ward & Co., Incorporated: With respect to my Wards Charg-All account, and
Charg-All Plus account, I agree to the following regarding all purchases made by me
or on my Charg-AII identification Plate:
A. I will pay the time sale price for all purchases, consisting of the cash sale price and a
finance charge at a periodic rate of I 1/4% per month on the previous month's ending bal-
ance of my account, which includes unpaid finance charges but does not include my cur-
rent month's charges, payments or credits (annual percentage rate 15%). A minimum
month finance charge not exceeding 500 may be assessed on balances up to $40. On
balances over $40 to $56, a minimum monthly finance charge not exceeding 700 may be
assessed.
B. I may use my account as a 30-day charge account if payment of the full outstanding
balance shown on my monthly statement is received by you prior to my next billing date.
In such event, no finance charge on such balance will be charged on any subsequent
statement.
C. For all purchases made on my Charg-AII Account, payment will be made by me as fol-
lows (minimum payment $5).
If The Highest The Minimum If The Highest The Minimum
Account Monthly Account Monthly
Balance Is: Payment Is: Balance Is: Payment Is:
$100.00 $ 5.00 $290.00 $12.00
120.00 6.00 340.00 13.00
140.00 7.00 380.00 14.00
160.00 8.00 410.00 15.00
180.00 9.00 440.00 16.00
210.00 (0.00 470.00 17.00
250.00 11.00 504.00 18.00
Over $504, payments is 1/28th of highest account balance. All payments adjusted to the
next dollar amount. For all purchases made on my separate Charg-AII Plus account, pay-
ment will be made by me in monthly installments equal to a minimum of 1/28th of my
highest account balance adjusted to the next dollar amount (minimum $5).
D. I wish to have available to me the convenience of a Charge-all account and a separate
Charge-all Plus account with you. I understand that all purchases made by me are eligible
to be charged to my Charg-all account, and that at my option, certain purchases made by
me, as described in your published merchandise list, may be charged to my Charg-all
Plus account. I wish to maintain both accounts with you.
E. A security interest in each item of merchandise purchased hereunder shall be retained
by you until such item is paid for in full. In the case of items purchased on different
dates, the first purchased shall be deemed first paid for. You hereby waive any security
interest of any kind in any property other than the goods sold hereunder. Upon default
by me, my entire balance shall at your option become due and payable. If this agree-
ment is referred to an outside attorney for collection, I will pay reasonable attorney's fees
and court costs as permitted by law. You have the right to terminate or otherwise limit
tus. s The agreement operates for an indefinite period and the
consumer is allowed to charge purchases to his account so long
as the outstanding balance due in any one month does not exceed
the credit limit established. The department store card is honored
only in the issuing store, where the bank credit card is honored at
any establishment which has entered into an agreement with the
issuing bank.
14
When the consumer wants to purchase merchandise in a store
honoring his credit card, he has the option of paying cash or charg-
ing the purchase. If he decides to charge the item, he presents
his credit card and the sales slip is stamped with his name and ac-
count number, which he signs. The sales slip states that the pur-
chase is to be charged to the customer's account, and that he
agrees to pay for the merchandise in accordance with the terms of
the charge account agreement which he had previously signed.
Under most charge account agreements the consumer has two
option available for payment. 5 He may pay the total cash price
of the purchase on his account within the second billing date fol-
lowing the purchase, 16 without incurring any service charge, or he
may pay in monthly installments. After the charge free period
expires, there is assessed a one and one quarter per cent 17 monthly
service charge upon the unpaid balance of the account. Each
month the customer is required to pay a minimum amount, deter-
mined as a percentage of the unpaid balance, as set forth in the
charge account agreement. Payments made on the account and
credits for returned merchandise are deducted and purchases
made during the current billing period are included in arriving
at the next balance. These purchases, if unpaid as of the next
billing date, are merged into the account to derive the new unpaid
balance for the succeeding bill. Under this procedure, the one and
one quarter per cent monthly service charge amounts to a fifteen
percent per annum charge for credit.
my account and upon your request I will return my Charg-all identification plofe to you.
The terms of this Agreement are subject to change upon prior notice to me. In the man-
ner provided by low. In such event, the new terms will be applicable to my previous
balance and to all subsequent purchases made by me.
F. The Charg-all and Charo-all Plus Agreement used by you in the state of my residence
shall be applicable to my purchases. If I subsequently move to another state, the Charg-all
and Charg-all Plus Agreement used by you in that state shall be applicable to my previous
balance and all subsequent purchases made by me.
RECEIPT OF FULLY EXECUTED COPY IS ACKNOWLEDGED
13. FEnERAL RESERVE SYSTEM REPORT: BANK CREDIT CARDS AND CHECK-
CREDIT PLANS at 12 (1968).
14. Articles cited note 10 supra.
15. See note 12 supra.
16. Id. The bank credit card agreement requires that the outstanding
balance be paid within 25 days after the first billing in order to avoid the
service charge.






The Pennsylvania general usury statute provides for a legal
rate of interest of six per cent per annum on loans of less than
fifty thousand dollars.' 8 A borrower, having contracted to pay
an excessive rate of interest, is liable on the contract because usur-
ious loans are not illegal per se in Pennsylvania. 19 However, he is
liable only for the legal rate of interest ° and if he has paid in ex-
cess of that rate, he has six months to recover the excess from the
lender. 21 Before a transaction can be usurious, it must involve a
loan of money or forbearance of a debt at a charge in excess of the
legal rate.22 Not all loans or forbearances of debt in Pennsylvania,
however, are limited by the six per cent ceiling.
The Pennsylvania General Assembly has enacted several stat-
utes which exempt a variety of transactions from the general in-
terest limit of six per cent.2 Such exemptions from the interest
ceiling are subject to legislative control since, at common law
the taking of any interest whatsoever was illegal, and the right to
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 3 (Supp. 1972) provides:
The lawful rate of interest for the loan or use of money in an
amount of less than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000), in all cases
where no express contract shall have been made for a less rate,
shall be six per cent per annum ...
19. Stout v. Stein, 89 Pa. Super. 479 (1929).
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 3 (Supp. 1972). See note 18 supra.
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 4 (1971) provides:
When a rate of interest for the loan or use of money, exceeding
that established by law, shall have been reserved or contracted for,
the borrower or debtor shall not be required to pay to the credi-
tor the excess over the legal rate, and it shall be lawful for such
borrower or debtor, at his option, to retain and deduct such excess
from the amount of any such debt, and in all cases where any
borrower or debtor shall heretofore or hereafter have voluntarily
paid the whole debt or sum loaned, together with interest ex-
ceeding the lawful rate, no action to recover back any such excess
shall be sustained in any court of this commonwealth, unless the
same shall have been commenced within six months from and
after the time of such payment.
22. Melnicoff v. Huber Inv. Co., 12 D. & C. 405, 407 (Phila. Munc.
Ct. 1929). It should be noted that Pennsylvania's usury statute itself does
not use the term forbearance. See note 18 supra. See also 14 S. WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS, § 1684 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1972).
23. The interest rate on small loans under PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7,
§§ 6151-57 (1967) is three per cent per month on the unpaid balance. The
interest rate on installment loans under PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 309 (1967)
is one percent per month on the oustanding balance. The interest rate
on consumer loans under PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6201-19 (Supp. 1972) is
two per cent per month on the unpaid balance. The interest rate on
home improvement loans under PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 500-101 to -602
(1965) is eight per cent per annum. The interest rates on car loans under
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 601-37 (1965) range between six and twelve per
cent per annum.
charge it a privilege granted by the state.2 4  This legislative
control is a subject within the police power of the state.25 The
only restriction on this legislative control in Pennsylvania is a
constitutional one. Under article III section thirty-two of the
Pennsylvania Constitution the legislature is prohibited from en-
acting a "local or special law in any case which has been or can be
provided for by general law. .. ."6 An exemption from the gen-
eral interest rate is not deemed to be a "local or special law" if
it is "founded on real, and not merely artificial, distinctions.
S. .2 The Goods and Services Installment Sales Act 28 is an ex-
emption from the general interest law29 which regulates credit
sales.
B. Time-Price Doctrine
The traditional view has been that the general usury statutes
do not apply to credit sales of merchandise.3 ° The theory is that
the seller is not engaged in lending money; he is merely selling
goods. According to the laissez-faire attitude of the times, the
seller, being the absolute owner of the object for sale, can de-
mand any price for it he desires. The cash price the seller quotes
is based on the assumption that he will receive the full purchase
price in cash when he delivers the goods to the buyer. If he is
not to receive the full cash price at that time, he is entitled to in-
crease the purchase price for a time sale. 31 In calculating the
amount to be added to the cash price the seller may take into con-
sideration: "what would be a proper interest upon the invest-
ment, . . . the chances of loss and failure to pay, the insurance
necessary to cover the transaction, the overhead expense for carry-
ing on a business of that kind . . ."32 and the value of receiving
the cash immediately. This has become known as the "time-sale"
or "time-price" doctrine.3 3 Under this theory, the addition made
24. Equitable Credit & Discount Co. v. Geier, 342 Pa. 445, 455, 21
A.2d 53, 58 (1941).
25. Id. at 456, 21 A.2d at 58.
26. PA. CONST. art. III, § 32.
27. Commonwealth v. Puder, 261 Pa. 129, 136, 104 A. 505, 506 (1918)
upholding the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania Small Loans Act, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6151-57 (1967). See also Equitable Credit & Discount
Co. v. Geier, 342 Pa. 445, 21 A.2d 53 (1941) upholding the constitutionality of
the Pennsylvania Consumer Discount Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6201-19
(Supp. 1972).
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 1101-2303 (Supp. 1972).
29. The constitutionality of the Goods and Services Installment Sales
Act is discussed at Sec. VB infra.
30. See, e.g., Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. 115 (1861); Melnicoff v. Huber
Inv. Co., 12 Pa. D. & C. 405 (Phila. Munc. Ct. 1929); Beete v. Bidgood, 7
B. & C. 453, 108 Eng. Rep. 792 (K.B. 1927). See also Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d
1065 (1967); 14 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, §§ 1684-86 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1972).
31. Authorities cited note 30 supra.
32. In re Bibbey, 9 F.2d 944, 946 (D. Minn. 1925).
33. Authorities cited note 30 supra.
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in connection with the credit sale is not deemed interest, but merely
represents the difference between the cash price and the time price.
This came to be known as the "time-price differential. '3 4 The ef-
fect of the time-price doctrine is to negate the application of all
interest or usury statutes and other legislation regulating the mak-
ing of loans on the sale of goods.3 5
Apparently, the first case to discuss the issue of whether the
time-price differential is interest was Dewar v. Span.36 The opin-
ion included dictum to the effect that such a time-price differential
would constitute usury if it exceeded the statutory rate. This case
was not followed, however, and the leading English case of Beete
v. Bidgood37 subsequently held that the sale of a plantation
with an added sum described as "interest" for the privilege of
paying in installments at a future date, was not usury even
though the difference between the cash price and the time-sale
price was greater than the rate of interest allowed under the pre-
vailing usury statute.
The time-price doctrine was adopted in the United States in
Hogg v. Ruffner.38 There the defendant contracted to purchase
land for $38,000, to be paid in ten annual installments rather than
paying a cash price of $20,000. He defaulted on his payments
and defended on the grounds that the contract was usurious and
unenforceable. The defendant's argument that the difference be-
tween the two prices constituted interest and, as such, was
usurious under the state usury statute was sustained by the
lower court. The Supreme Court reversed, stating what it re-
ferred to as the common law definition of usury. "To constitute
usury, there must either be a loan and taking of usurious inter-
est, or the taking of more than the legal interest for the forbear-
ance of a debt or sum of money due."39 To illustrate what the
Court deemed a proper time-price sale the following hypothetical
was given:
[I] f A proposes to sell B a tract of land for $10,000 in cash,
or for $20,000 payable in ten annual installments, and if
B prefers to pay the larger sum to gain time, the contract
cannot be called usurious. A vendor may prefer $100 in
34. Id.
35. B. CURREN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION at 13 (1965).
36. 3 T.R. 425, 100 Eng. Rep. 656 (K.B. 1789). See Comment, Usury
in Installment Sales, 2 LAW & CONIEMP. PROB. 148, 154-70 (1935).
37. 7 B. & C. 453, 108 Eng. Rep. 792 (K.B. 1827).
38. 66 U.S. 115 (1861). A thorough compilation of American cases
following Hogg is contained in Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 1065 (1967).
39. C3 U.S. at 118.
hand to double the sum in expectancy, and a purchaser
may prefer the greater price with the longer credit. .... 40
The Court concluded by holding that "[s]uch a contract has none
of the characteristics of usury; it is not for the loan of money, or
forbearance of a debt."
4 1
The obvious result of the time-price doctrine is to exempt
credit sales from general interest and usury statutes. However,
not all credit sales of merchandise are covered by the time-price
doctrine and thereby exempted from the usury laws. There are
two universal conditions which must be met in order to come un-
der the time-price doctrine. The first requirement is that there
must be a bona fide sale of goods,42 i.e., the transaction cannot be
a mere cloak for a usurious loan. Secondly, the seller must
clearly state both the time-price and the cash price to the prospec-
tive purchaser.43 As stated in McNash v. General Credit Corp.:
44
[I]t must appear that the buyer actually was informed of
and had the opportunity to choose between a time sale
price and a cash sale price. It is not enough to merely
show that the instruments signed evidencing the indebted-
ness refer to a time price or time differential when, in
fact, the buyer was never quoted a time sale price as such.
C. Common Law Development of the Time-Price
Doctrine in Pennsylvania
The existing common law of Pennsylvania in regard to credit
sales has developed along the traditional path outlined above. Penn-
sylvania law has evolved from the Usury Statute of 1858 which
provided:
The lawful rate of interest for the loan or use of
money, in all cases where no express contract shall have
been made for a less rate, shall be six percent per annum.
45
Under this statute the Pennsylvania courts adopted the time-
40. Id. at 118-19.
41. Id. at 119.
42. See, e.g., Daniel v. First Nat'l Bank, 227 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1955).
For a thorough compilation of cases see Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 1065, 1124-60
(1967).
43. See, e.g. Daniel v. First Nat'l Bank, 227 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1955).
See generally Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 1065, 1128-36 (1967). See also McNish
v. General Credit Corp., 164 Neb. 526, 83 N.W.2d 1 (1957).
44. 164 Neb. 526, 527, 83 N.W.2d 1, 9-10 (1957).
45. Usury Statute, Act. of May 28, 1858, P.L. 622, as amended, 41
P.S. § 3 (Supp. 1972). This statute was derived from the Usury Act of
1723 which prohibited "the taking, directly or indirectly, for any bonds or
contract for the loan or use of money, or other commodities, above the
value of six pounds for the forbearance of one hundred or the value thereof
for one year. . . ." See Evans v. Negley, 13 S. & R. 218, 219 (Pa. 1825)
(The court held what appears to be a credit sale to be governed by this
earlier usury statute). Hartsauft v. Uhlinger, 115 Pa. 270, 273, 8 A. 244,
246 (1886) and Fitzsimons v. Baum, 44 Pa. 32, 40 (1862) have interpreted
Evans as merely unveiling an attempt to evade the usury statute.
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In Melnicoff the plaintiff contracted to buy a car from the
defendant under a "lease plan." According to the terms of the
contract, the plaintiff was charged a $190 "settlement charge"
which included insurance and interest for a one year period. The
plaintiff alleged that, since insurance cost only $15 a year and in-
terest of six per cent a year on the contract price amount to only
$33, the $142 difference in the "settlement charge" was usurious
and that he was entitled to recover this sum from the defend-
ant. In determining whether the transaction was usurious the
court stated that, "[i] n order for a transaction to be usurious there
must either be a loan at more than the legal rate of interest or
the exaction of a greater than the legal rate for the forbearance
of a debt or sum of money due. ' 47 The court felt that, "[t] he most
that [could] be said in favor of the plaintiff's position is that the
bailment lease indicated a contract to pay a greater sum for the
purchase of an automobile on credit than would have been paid
had the sale been for cash. '45 The court, after an extensive re-
view of the existing Pennsylvania authorities,49 expressly adopted
the time-price doctrine stating:
[T]he rule [is] well settled that usuary cannot be predi-
cated upon the fact that property is sold on credit and at
an advance of price over what would be charged in the
case of a cash sale so long as it appears that the price
charged is in fact fixed for the purchase of goods on credit
with no intention or purpose of defeating the usury laws,
although the difference between the cash price and the
credit, if considered as interest amounts to more than the
legal rate.50
The court thereby established the two universal conditions of the
time-price doctrines-a bona fide sale and quotation of two prices
-as requirements in Pennsylvania.
Melnicoff is firmly established as valid case law, having been
cited numerous times by Pennsylvania courts.51 The Pennsyl-
46. 12 Pa. D. & C. 405 (Phila. Munc. Ct. 1929).
47. Id. at 407.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 406-08.
50. Id. at 407.
51. See, e.g., Equitable Credit & Discount Co. v. Geier, 342 Pa. 445,
455, 21 A.2d 53, 58 n.7 (1941); Equipment Finance, Inc. v. Grannas, 207 Pa.
Super. 363, 366, 218 A.2d 81, 82 (1966); Psomas v. Approved Bancredit
Corp., 40 Pa. D. & C.2d 51, 60 (C.P. Alleg. 1965); Personal Discount Co. v.
Lincoln Tire Co., 67 Pa. D. & C. 35, 39 (C.P. Phila. 1949). See also Langille
v. Central-Penn Nat'l Bank, 156 A.2d 410, 411-12 (Del. Ch. 1959) (constru-
ing Pennsylvania law).
vania Supreme Court indicated its approval in Equitable Credit &
Discount Co. v. Geier5 2 where the Consumer Discount Company
Act,6 3 regulating installment loans, was held constitutional. In
so ruling the Pennsylvania Supreme Court included dicta stating:
Where a greater charge is exacted in the case of a sale on
credit than in a cash sale it is included in the selling price
of the article. It being uniformly held'that sellers are free
to contract with buyers as to the terms and conditions of
sales, the financing of sales of merchandise by the exten-
sion of credit has never been considered subject to the
prohibition of usury .... 54
The time-price doctrine also applies when the seller assigns
the buyer's indebtedness (evidenced by a conditional sales con-
tract, a bond, a judgment note or chattel mortgage) to a third per-
son in the financing business.55 A minority of jurisdictions have
held that such a transaction, though in the form of a sale, is in
reality merely a cloak for usury.56 Nevertheless, the general rule
is to the contrary 57 and has been adopted in Pennsylvania.5" In
Personal Discount Co. v. Lincoln Tire Co.,5 an agreement was en-
tered whereby the defendant would have its customers who paid
in installments execute bailment leases and judgment notes for a
sum including a "budget charge." The defendant then sold these
notes to the plaintiff at a discount (probably receiving the cash
price of the goods), but remained liable for any customer de-
faults. The court ruled that the transactions were clearly within
the time-price doctrine,60 and concluded that, "[a] s between plain-
tiff and defendant, no question of usury was involved as plaintiff
merely bought notes from defendant without lending them any
money. A sale of negotiable instruments is not subject to the
usury laws."61
A similar situation in regard to construction materials arose in
Langille v. Central-Penn National Bank.62 The parties stipulated
52. 342 Pa. 445, 21 A.2d 53 (1941).
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6201-19 (Supp. 1972).
54. Equitable Credit & Discount Co. v. Geier, 342 Pa. 445, 455, 21
A.2d 53, 58 (1941).
55. See Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 1065, 1091-1112 (1967).
56. See, e.g., Daniel v. First Nat'l Bank, 227 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1955)
(construing Alabama law); Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220
Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973 (1952); Midland Loan Finance Co. v. Lorentz,
209 Minn. 278, 296 N.W. 911 (1941); Nelson v. General Credit Corp., 166
Neb. 770, 90 N.W.2d 799 (1958). See generally Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 1065,
1136-39 (1967).
57. Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 1065, 1091 (1967).
58. Equipment Finance, Inc. v. Grannas, 207 Pa. Super. 363, 218 A.2d
81 (1966); Personal Discount Co. v. Lincoln Tire Co., 67 Pa. D. & C. 35
(C.P. Phila. 1949). See also Langille v. Central-Penn Nat'l Bank, 156 A.2d
410 (Del. Ch. 1959).
59. 67 Pa. D. & C. 35 (C.P. Phila. 1949).
60. Id. at 39.
61. Id. at 40.
62. 156 A.2d 410 (Del. Ch. 1959). For a similar application of the law
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that the validity of the transaction was governed by Pennsylvania
law and the Delaware Supreme Court, sitting in equity, conducted
a thorough review of that law. 63 The court, citing Melnicoff, Geier,
and Lincoln Tire Co., rejected the plaintiffs' contention that since
the pre-existing obligation of the finance company required it to
purchase the judgment notes from the seller, the extension of
credit came from the finance company and therefore the transac-
tion was actually a loan covered by the usury statute.6 4 In sum-
mation, Mr. Chief Justice Southerland stated:
The decisive point here is that the so-called loan by Barco
[financing company] was made as a part of a sale of goods
on a deferred payment plan and that the primary and
basic purpose of the transaction was the purchase of goods.
Such a sale under the Pennsylvania decisions is not in our
opinion subject to the usury laws. . . . We cannot think
that the prearranging of the financing makes the transac-
tion usurious.65
The final case of import to the development of Pennsylvania
case law concerning credit sales is Equipment Finance, Inc. v.
Grannas.60 This case also involved the assignment of the buyer's
indebtedness to a third person. The distinguishing factor, mer-
iting review by the superior court, was the fact that the in-
debtedness was represented by a security agreement and therefore
subject to article nine of the Uniform Commercial Code. The court
noted that, "[a] careful review of the law of Pennsylvania satis-
fies us that prior to the Code this transaction would not be re-
garded as usurious. '6 7 The court, in concluding that article nine
did not change the effect of the time-price doctrine on security
agreements, based its decision on the fact that, "[n]owhere in this
article, which is a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of se-
curity interests in personal property, is any attempt made to regu-
late financing charges." 68 The opinion also contained dicta to the
effect that neither the Small Loan Act,69 the Consumer Discount
Company Act,70 nor the Motor Vehicles Sales Finance Act 71 were
applicable to installment credit sales and the financing charges
by a Pennsylvania court see Psomas v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 40 Pa.
D. & C.2d 51 (C.P. Alleg. 1965).
63. Langille v. Central-Penn Nat'l Bank, 156 A.2d 410, 411-12 (Del.
Ch. 1959).
64. Id. at 412.
65. Id.
66. 207 Pa. Super. 363, 218 A.2d 81 (1966).
67. Id. at 367, 218 A.2d at 83.
68. Id. at 369, 218 A.2d at 84.
69. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6151-57 (1967).
70. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6201-19 (Supp. 1972).
71. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 601-37 (1965).
being assessed in such transactions. 2
III. THE GOODS AND SERVICES INSTALLMENT SALES ACT
In response to the increased volume of credit sales,78 legisla-
tures throughout the country have enacted statutes regulating
installment sales.74 In 1966, shortly after the Grannas case pointed
out the lack of such regulation, the Pennsylvania General Assem-
bly enacted the Goods and Services Installment Sales Act.75 The
Act regulates all retail installment contracts for the sale of goods
and services, 76 except those covered by the Motor Vehicle Sales
Finance Act 77 and the Home Improvement Finance Act.78 The
GSISA is basically a codification of the Pennsylvania common law
on credit sales in that it adopts definitions of the terms "cash
sale price, ' 79 "time sale price,"80 and "time price differential" '
which are essentially the same terms used at common law. How-
ever, the Act must be deemed an expansion of the common law in
that it also regulates a type of credit sale that did not exist at com-
mon law, namely, those credit sales on revolving charge accounts.82
72. Equipment Finance, Inc. v. Grannas, 207 Pa. Super. 363, 369,
218 A.2d 81, 84 (1966).
73. See notes 1-8 and accompanying text supra.
74. See 1 CCH INSTALLMENT CXDIT GUmE, 1 520 and 630 for a com-
plete listing of pertinent state statutes.
75. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 1101-2303 (Supp. 1972) [hereinafter re-
ferred to as the GSISA]. See Recent Legislation: The Pennsylvania Goods
and Services Installment Sales Act, 12 VILL. L. REV. 643 (1967).
76. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 1101-2303 (Supp. 1972).
77. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 601-37 (1965).
78. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 500-101 to -602 (1965).
79. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1201 (8) (Supp. 1972) providing:
"Cash sale price" means the cash sale price stated in a retail in-
stallment contract for which the seller would sell or furnish to the
buyer and the buyer would buy or obtain from the seller the
goods or services which are the subject matter of a retail install-
ment contract if the sale were a sale for cash instead of a retail
installment sale. The cash sale price may include any taxes and
cash sale prices for accessories and services, if any, included in a
retail installment sale.
80. Id. § 1201(9) providing:
"Time sale price" means the total of the cash sale price of the
goods or services and the amounts, if any, included for insurance,
official fees and service charge.
81. Id. § 1201(10) providing:
"Time price differential" or "service charge" means the amount
however denominated or expressed which the retail buyer con-
tracts to pay or pays for the privilege of purchasing goods or
services to be paid for by the buyer in installments; it does not
include the amounts, if any, charged for insurance premiums, de-
linquency charge, attorney's fees, court costs, collection expenses
or official fees. Wherever either of such terms is required to be
used under the provisions of this act the other may be used inter-
changeably.
See Elder v. Doer, 175 Neb. 483, 491, 122 N.W.2d 528, 534 (1963) for a
simplified layman's definition of the term.
82. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 1901-11 (Supp. 1972). The Act also regu-
lates two other types of installment sales. The first type of transaction
covered is the typical retail installment sale which involves the purchase of
one item or service on credit. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 1301-1604 (Supp.
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
The crucial definition in the GSISA which affects credit sales
provides:
'Retail installment account' or 'installment account' or 're-
volving account' means an account established by an
agreement pursuant to which the buyer promises to pay,
in installments, to a retail seller or to a financing agency,
his outstanding balance incurred in retail installment
sales, whether or not a security interest in the goods is
retained by the seller, and which provides for a service
charge which is expressed as a percentage of the periodic
balances to accrue thereafter providing such charge is not
capitalized or stated as a dollar amount in such agree-
ment.83
There can be no doubt that the legislature has the authority
to expand the common law by statute. The expansion of the com-
mon law under the GSISA, however, leaves the Act subject to
many criticisms. The first problem arises from the fact that the
mechanics of a revolving charge account transaction are so differ-
ent from the ordinary credit sale that the time price doctrine, as
it existed at common law, is inapplicable. The primary require-
ment implicit in a time-price transaction is the quotation of two
prices, the time price and the cash price, to the prospective pur-
chaser.8 4 In the revolving charge situation, it is impossible to quote
a time price when the purchase is made since it cannot be ascer-
tained.8 5 "The credit price ...may only be calculated after the
buyer has finished paying the monthly installments. [At that
time] [b]y calculating the monthly unpaid balance on the item
purchased and adding the monthly service charge on the unpaid
balance, the buyer can arrive at the revolving credit price.186
Three other factors complicate the calculation and increase
the difficulty in arriving at the final credit price for a single item.
First, the buyer may reduce the total carrying charge by increas-
ing the number or amounts of his payments. This reduces the
1972). Regulation of this type of transaction was well within the common
law and this section of the Act is not an expansion thereof. Add-on sales
are also governed by the Act. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 1801-06 (Supp.
1972). This section is probably not an expansion of the common law
since such transactions no doubt frequently occurred, though no cases
specifically on point were found.
83. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1201(7) (Supp. 1972).
84. See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
85. Warren, Regulation of Finance Charges in Retail Installment
Sales, 68 YALE L.J. 839, 848 (1959); Jordan and Warren, Disclosure of Fi-
nance Charges: A Rationale, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1305-13 (1966), Com-
ment, Revolving Credit, 55 Nw. L. REV. 330, 338-39 n.40 (1960).
86. Comment, Bank Credit Cards-The Service Charge Problem, 77
DICK. L. REv. 139, 147-48 (1972).
outstanding balance upon which the carrying charges are com-
puted. Conversely, the buyer may delay or default in his monthly
payments, thereby increasing the carrying charges and incurring
a default charge. Thirdly, he may make additional purchases mak-
ing it difficult to discover which items are being paid off by the
monthly payment and which items account for the present serv-
ice charge.
The GSISA may also be criticized as to its provisions for serv-
ice charges:
8 7
The service charge shall be inclusive of all charges in-
cident to investigating and making the contract and for
the extension of the credit provided for in the contract,
and no fee, expense or other charge whatsoever shall be
taken, received, reserved or contracted for except as oth-
erwise provided in this act. 8
Service charges are exempt from interest limits when for legiti-
mate expenses they are incurred by the creditor in rendering his
services to the debtor.89 These expenses include: 90 (1) the cost of
credit to the grantor, including the cost of inflation; (2) administra-
tive expenses, including credit investigation, current credit informa-
tion on customers, records maintenance, billing, accounting, collec-
tion, credit overhead, the expense of maintaining accounts paid with-
in thirty days; and (3) uncollectable accounts. Such expenses do
not include charges for the extension of the credit provided for in
the contract. When service charges are assessed for the service of
making revolving credit available, they are interest within the
meaning of statutes setting a maximum rate of interest.9 1
Furthermore, it has been pointed out that:
If the charges were merely for the service of collecting the
various purchases and consolidating them into one account,
the charges would presumably be a specified sum for each
purchase, regardless of the amount of the total statement
sent to the holder. Instead the charges are determined
from the amount of the total statement, even though the
overhead cost per purchase is a constant in the issuer's
operations.
92
Thus, if the service were really a charge for services rather than
interest it would not be computed on the outstanding monthly
balance, as it is under the GSISA 3 Similarly, economists have
87. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 1501-04 (Supp. 1972).
88. Id. § 1504 (emphasis added).
89. Comment, Revolving Credit, 55 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 330, 335 (1960).
90. I DEPARTMENT OF COMmERCE, ADVISORY COMMrTrEE REPORT, Fl-
NANCING THE AMERICAN CONSUMER, at 7-9 (1972).
91. Comment, Revolving Credit, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 330, 335 (1960).
92. Comment, Regulation of Installment Credit Cards, 35 U. Cnv. L.
REv. 424, 449 (1966).
93. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1904 (Supp. 1972) providing:
[T]he seller or holder of a retail installment account may charge,
receive and collect the service charge authorized by this act.
The service charge shall not exceed the following rates computed
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described the differentiation between finance charges and interest
as being of "little economic significance."9' 4 "Each is a cost of
credit, and if the consumer must be protected against excessive
credit charges, finance charges are as deserving of regulation
as interest rates."0 5  The logical conclusion of the above analysis
is that charge accounts should be subjected to the usury laws.
This same conclusion is reached via another route and indi-
cates yet a third criticism of the GSISA. The Act is based on
the exemption of credit sales under the time price doctrine, from the
usury statute"8 regulating interest on loans. However, there ap-
pears to be no analytic economic difference between a loan and a
credit sale97 and as one author states:
[C]redit or loan is involved in every exchange in which
there is delay in completing the transaction. In any case
in which the buyer does not render payment to the seller
upon acquisition of the seller's goods or services, the eco-
nomic reality of the situation requires us to acknowledge
that the seller is making a loan to the buyer of the value
of those goods for as long a period as it takes the buyer
to complete his payments. . . . On this principle, we
must recognize the unreality of the legal distinction be-
tween cash credit and vendor credit.
98
The similarity of a direct loan and a credit sale is best illus-
trated by an example. If a buyer is going to purchase a $500 tele-
vision but has only $100 cash he has two options. If he borrows
the remaining $400 from a bank the interest rate will be governed
by the general interest law. If instead he buys the television under
an installment sale contract, the time price might be quoted as
$550 and the seller will make a $50 profit on his advance. Due
to the exemption of credit sales from the usury law under the
time-price doctrine, the buyer in the second transaction goes un-
on the outstanding balances from month to month:
(a) On the outstanding balance, one and one-quarter per cent
1Y% per month.
94. I FEDERAL RESERVE REPORT, supra note 2, vol. 2, at 49.
95. Warren, Regulation of Finance Charges in Retail Installment
Sales, 68 YALE L.J. 839, 850 (1959).
96. PA. STAT. ANx. tit. 41, § 3 (Supp. 1972). See note 18 supra.
97. Recent Developments, Consumer Credit, 69 MICH. L. REv. 1368,
1378 (1971); McEwen, Eoonomic Issues in State Regulation of Consumer
Credit, 8 B.C. Irm'. & COM. L. Rlv. 387, 390-92 (1967); Warren, Regulation
of Finance Charges in Retail Installment Sales, 68 YALE L.J. 839, 842-43
(1959); Shanks, Practical Problems in the Application of Archaic Usury
Statutes, 53 VA. L. REv. 327, 343 (1967). Even B. CuRmtN, TRENDS IN CON-
SUbmn CREDrr LEGISLATION at 83 (1965) admits that distinguishing the two
is not always easy.
98. McEwen, Economic Issues in State Regulation of Consumer Credit,
8 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 387, 390-91 (1967).
protected despite the similarity of the two transactions. In both
cases the buyer pays a sum of money over and above the article's
cash price for the privilege of deferring payment. However, in the
direct loan situation that sum would be limited to $24 (6 per cent
per year) while in the credit sale the sum is more than twice as
much.
The discrepancy rests on an historical distinction. "[W]hen
courts were first asked to construe the usury law in relation to
the credit sale, the installment device was still a comparative in-
fant, normally associated with [the purchase of] 'luxuries' . ... 99
This provided a policy basis for distinguishing it from the direct
loan. The courts viewed usury laws as protecting needy, desper-
ate borrowers from rapacious money lenders, whereas the buyer's
of luxuries did not need such protection since they could pro-
tect themselves by simply refraining from making the pur-
chase.100
Today, a purchaser on credit can be as needy as any borrower.
By the standards of contemporary American society, a consumer
can "need" a refrigerator or car as much as a loan. Obviously,
many people do not have the necessary cash for such items and
therefore, must depend on credit or direct loans.
If the usury laws were designed to protect weak and needy
persons from the overreaching of economically superior
renters of capital, then it should be recognized that the
bargaining position of installment buyers may be as dis-
advantageous as that of borrowers of money.' 0 '
This too suggests subjecting installment sales to the usury laws.
The advisability of applying common law rules and logic to a
radically different economic environment, however, is question-
able. 102 The usury statutes were enacted in an era when little in-
stallment buying was done and were aimed at the evils associated
with a direct loan. The time-price doctrine was more compat-
ible with the mercantile practices of the nineteenth century when
goods were not standardized with set prices as they are today. Fur-
99. Warren, Regulation of Finance Charges in Retail Installment
Sales, 68 YALE L.J. 839, 842 (1959).
100. See, e.g., General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, 218 Mo.
App. 68, 77-78, 262 S.W. 425, 423 (1924).
101. Warren, Regulation v Finance Charges in Retail Installment
Sales, 68 YALE L.J. 839, 943 (1959).
102. See Shanks, Practical Problems in the Application of Archaic
Usury Statutes, 53 VA. L. REV. 327, 327-33 (1967); Recent Developments,
Consumer Credit, 69 MicH. L. REv. 1368, 1370-73 (1971); Warren, Regula-
tion of Finance Charges in Retail Installment Sales, 68 YALE L.J. 839-940-51
(1959); Comment, Judicial and Legislative Treatment of "Usurious" Credit
Sales, 71 HAav. L. Rv. 1143, 1146 (1958); Comment, Limiting Cosumer
Credit Charges by Reinterpretation of General Usury Laws and by Sep-
arate Regulation, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 303, 303-10 (1960); Comment, Usury in
Installment Sales, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PiEO. 148, 148-54 and 170-72 (1935).
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thermore, neither the usury statutes nor the time-price doctrine
contemplated a transaction such as the revolving charge ac-
count. Both were addressed to a one-time-only type transaction
rather than a multi-purchase credit agreement which could last in-
definitely. Finally, "the vast product of American industry could
not be marketed without installment selling . . . [and] [t]o sub-
ject sales-finance companies to the usury acts might constitute
a death blow to this vital enterprise.' 10 There can be little doubt
that it is not economically practical to operate revolving charge
accounts within the majority of usury statutes since they fix their
interest rates between six and eight per cent per annum.10 4 This
is proven by the fact that Chase Manhattan Bank discontinued its
charge card (Uni-Serv) because it could not operate profitably
with a one per cent per month (twelve per cent per year) service
charge.10 5 The basic problem is therefore to affect an equitable
balance between protecting consumers against excessive finance
charges and maintaining an economically feasible profit margin
for revolving charge accounts.
IV. THE REVOLVING CHARGE AND USURY IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
A number of courts outside of Pennsylvania have recently been
faced with this balancing problem in the form of suits challeng-
ing as usurious the interest charge on revolving accounts. These
courts have divided into two bipolar groups. One group of cases
exempts the revolving charge from the general interest law on
the grounds that it falls within the time-price doctrine. The op-
posing rationale finds a loan or forbearance in the credit sale
and holds the time-price differential to be interest in violation of
the usury laws. Other cases have been decided on the alternative
theory that the retail installment sales statutes authorizing the
charge are unconstitutional as special legislation.10 6
103. Warren, Regulation of Finance Charges in Retail Installment Sales,
68 YALE L.J. 839, 850 (1959).
104. See B. CuRRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CRDrr LEGISLATION at 15
(1965) for a breakdown of state usury statutes according to the percentage
of interest permitted. See also 1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 510.
105. Comment, Regulation of Consumer Credit-The Credit Card and
the State Legislature, 73 YALE L.J. 886, 890 n.22 (1964). Accord, Lynch,
Consumer Credit at Ten Percent Simple: The Arkansas Case, 68 U. ILL.
L. F. 592, 596-99 (1968).
106. Elder v. Doerr, 175 Neb. 483, 122 N.W.2d 528 (1963), cert. dis-
missed, 377 U.S. 973 (1964); Cecil v. Allied Stores Corp., Mont. Dist. Ct.,
No. 72647-C, May 22, 1972 [4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIrr GUIDE 99,181].
For an explanation and analysis of this position and its applicability to
Pennsylvania, see Sec. VB infra.
A. Revolving Charge Sales Are Within the Time Price Doctrine
Six courts, when confronted with the bona fides of revolving
charge sales as credit sales have ruled, with little analysis, that
such sales come within the time-price doctrine and are thereby ex-
empted from the usury law. 0 7 Representative of these courts is the
opinion of the Tennessee Supreme Court in Dennis v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co.108 Sears obtained a judgment against Dennis for the
outstanding balance due on her revolving charge account. Dennis
appealed the decision on the grounds that the statute which au-
thorized the charging of one and one-half per cent per month on
the outstanding balance was unconstitutional and usurious in that
it violated the Tennessee constitutional provision establishing the
maximum interest rate as ten per cent per annum. The court, in
reviewing the appeal, held that, "the term interest did not apply
to the price differential charged on a credit sale. In other words,
where goods were sold for one price for cash and a higher price
for credit, the difference charged was not interest. ' 10 Similarly,
in Sliger v. R.H. Macy & Co.,110 the New Jersey Supreme Court rule
that, "an increase in price for a credit sale over the cash sale price
is not a loan or forbearance of money . . . we think the revolv-
ing credit concept does come within the time-price doctrine.
"111 Such reasoning, however, has not gone uncontroverted.
B. Revolving Charge Sales Are Not Within
the Time Price Doctrine
Three jurisdictions have specifically ruled that revolving
charge accounts are subject to the usury laws,11 2 and two others
have abrogated the time-price doctrine entirely, thereby subjecting
all credit sales to the general interest law."18 Arkansas became
107. Uni-Serv. Corp. v. Commissioner of Banks, 349 Mass. 283, 207
N.E.2d 906 (1965); Maine Merchant's Ass'n v. Campbell, 287 A.2d 430
(Me. 1972); Sliger v. R.H. Macy's & Co., 59 N.J. 465, 283 A.2d 904 (1972);
Dennis v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 445 S.W.2d 260 (Tenn. 1969); Kass v. Gar-
finkel, Civil Div., No. CA 4317-71 (July 10, 1972 D.C. Superior Ct., [4 CCH
CONSUMER CREDIT GuIDE 99,160]; Iowa v. Yonkers Bros., Iowa Dist. Ct.,
Equity No. 74765, Jan. 25, 1972 [4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 1 99,179].
108. 446 S.W.2d 260 (Tenn. 1969). See generally Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d
682, 684-85 (1972).
109. 446 S.W.2d at 264.
110. 59 N.J. 465, 283 A.2d 904 (1972).
111. Id. at 469, 283 A.2d at 906.
112. Montana: Cecil v. Allied Stores Corp., Mont. Dist. Ct., No. 72647,
May 22, 1972 [4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 99,181]; South Dakota:
Rollinger v. J.C. Penny Co., 192 N.W.2d 699 (S.D. 1971); Wisconsin: Wis-
consin v. J.C. Penny Co., 48 Wis. 2d 125, 179 N.W.2d 641 (1970). (The Wis-
consin legislature has nullified the above case by enacting Wis. STAT.
§ 422.201 (1971) which exempts revolving charge accounts from usury limi-
tations.
113. Arkansas: Sloan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 228 Ark. 464, 308 S.W.
2d 802 (1957); Nebraska: Elder v. Doerr, 175 Neb. 483, 122 N.W.2d 528
(1963), cert. dismissed, 377 U.S. 973 (1964); Lloyd v. Gutgsell, 175 Neb.
775, 124 N.W.2d 198 (1963). (The Nebraska legislature has nullified the
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the first jurisdiction to severely limit the common law time-price
doctrine. In Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp.,114 the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court, in a prospective caveat, established a new
standard by which credit sales were to be judged. The court al-
lowed that:
A seller may, in a bona fide transaction, increase the
price to compensate for the risk that is involved in a credit
sale. But there may be a question of fact as to whether
the so-called credit price was bona fide as such or only a
cloak for usury."' 5
In Sloan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.," 8 the Arkansas court effec-
tively eliminated the time-price doctrine by holding that the con-
stitutional interest rate of ten per cent per annum applied not only
to loans of money or to debts after they become due, but also has
application to the sale of merchandise on credit.1' 7 This ruling
obviously includes revolving charge sales, despite the fact they
were not specifically considered. Similarly, without explicitly
considering charge accounts, the Nebraska Supreme Court has, in
effect, ruled that they would be subject to the usury law." s  In
Lloyd v. Gutgsell the court concluded that,
[w] here a time sale price is determined by applying a cer-
tain schedule of rates or charges to the cash price, the re-
sulting product is interest. . . . A transaction handled in
this manner is essentially a loan to finance the balance of
the cash purchase price .... 19
A service charge calculated as a percentage of an outstanding bal-
ance due, is patently within this definition of loan and interest.
Three other courts in reviewing revolving charge accounts
have found a loan or forbearance in the transaction, thereby
above cases by enacting NE_. REV. STAT. §§ 45-204 to -208 which exempt
revolving charge accounts from usury statutes).
114. 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973 (1952). See B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN
CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION at 85 (1965); Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 1065, 1130-31
& 1144-45 (1967).
115. 220 Ark. at 609, 249 S.W.2d at 978.
116. 228 Ark. 464, 308 S.W.2d 802 (1957). See B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN
CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION at 87 (1965); Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 1065, 1155
(1967).
117. 228 Ark. 464, 308 S.W.2d 802.
118. Elder v. Doerr, 175 Neb. 483, 122 N.W.2d 528 (1963), cert. dis-
missed, 377 U.S. 973 (1964); Lloyd v. Gutgsell, 175 Neb. 775, 124 N.W.2d
198 (1963). See B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION at
87-89 (1967); Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 1065, 1153 & 1164 (1967); Comment, Serv-
ice Charges for Revolving Charge Accounts: A Time-Price Exemption or
Usury, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 905, 911-12 (1971). (The legislature of Nebraska
has nullified the above cases by enacting NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 45-204 to -208
which exempts the revolving charge from usury limitations).
119. Lloyd v. Gutgsell, 175 Neb. 775, 782-83, 124 N.W.2d 198, 204 (1963).
bringing such accounts within the scope of the general usury
law.12 0 Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 1 2 1 most explicit of the three
opinions, is illustrative of their reasoning. In considering the de-
fendant's typical revolving charge account, 122 the court held the
service charge to be interest on two distinct grounds. First, the
court concluded that as a factual matter, the revolving charge
simply did not qualify as a traditional time-price sale. This con-
clusion was based primarily on the fact that such accounts involve
"in reality only one price, the cash price."'1 23 In other words, the
required disclosure of two prices, a time-price and a cash price,
2 4
was not present since the cash price was not determinable at
the time of the sale.12 5
Secondly, the court held that the revolving charge account
agreement constituted a contract by which defendant agreed to
forbear from the collection of an existing debt and was therefore
subject to the usury law. The traditional definition of forbear-
ance requires the refraining from collection of a debt presently
due and payable, 126 thus requiring the preexistence of a debtor-
creditor relationship. "In the traditional time-price sale, because
the agreement to forbear and the debt owed the seller are created
simultaneously, there is no 'forbearance' in the sense required for
a finding of usury."'1 27 The Wisconsin Supreme Court sidestepped
this impediment, finding forbearance in the fact that:
The purchase of goods creates an obligation to pay for
them . . . upon the failure to pay for the goods received
at the time of purchase, a debt is created and a relationship
of debtor-creditor is created. . . . In the agreement the
parties merely agree to forbear; the actual forbearance oc-
curs after the purchase when the purchaser does not pay
within thirty days.'
28
Except in a time-price situation, any charge for such forbearance
has long been recognized as interest subject to the general usury
laws. 12 9 Both facets of this reasoning were adopted verbatim by
120. Cases cited note 112 supra.
121. 48 Wis. 2d 125, 179 N.W.2d 641 (1970). See Comment, Service
Charges for Revolving Charge Accounts: A Time-Price Exemption or Us-
ury, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 905, 912-16 (1971); Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 682, 683-84
(1972). (The legislature of Wisconsin has nullified the above case by en-
acting Wis. STAT. § 422.201 (1971) which exempts revolving charge ac-
counts from usury limitations).
122. See notes 12-16 and accompanying text supra.
123. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penny Co., 48 Wis. 2d 125, 150, 179 N.W.2d 641,
651 (1970).
124. See notes 43 and 44 and accompanying text supra.
125. See notes 85 and 86 and accompanying text supra.
126. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at 773 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). See also
Melnicoff v. Huber Inv. Co., 12 Pa. D. & C. 405 (Phila. Munc. Ct. 1929).
127. Comment, Service Charges for Revolving Charge Accounts: A
Time-Price Exemption for Usury, 71 COLU. L. REV. 905, 914 (1971).
128. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penny Co., 48 Wis. 2d 125, 135, 179 N.W.2d 641,
646 (1970).
129. Statute of Usury, 1713, 12 Anne, c.16, states:
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the South Dakota Supreme Court in Rollinger v. J.C. Penney.1 0
That court made it abundantly clear that:
[T] he forbearance need not appear at the inception of the
contract. The fact that the buyer enjoys a free period,
usually 30 days or one billing period, in which he may
postpone payment without charge or penalty does not al-
ter the transaction. During this period the forbearance
merely remains dormant and manifests itself automati-
cally when the buyer does not pay the full purchase price
before the second billing.13'
Such logic is obviously applicable to the common law of Penn-
sylvania.13 2 However, the Pennsylvania General Assembly has
codified the common law by enacting the Goods and Services In-
stallment Sales Act. 8 3 Consequently, a judicial determination that
the underlying principle, a time-price exemption for credit sales
on revolving charge cards, is untenable would be of no consequence
unless the statute itself is declared invalid. A Montana district
court in Cecil v. Allied Stores Corp.,184 furnished a viable approach
to this dilemma. The court, after reviewing the pertinent cases
from Arkansas, Nebraska, Wisconsin, and South Dakota' 35 and
attempting to distinguish the opposing cases,136 concluded that
Montana's statutory service charge on revolving charge accounts
constituted interest rates for a forbearance of money. 13 7 In the
court's opinion such a statutory rate was not in violation of the
usury law, but it felt that the legislature had enacted a special
interest law in violation of the Montana Constitution.3 8 Reason-
ing that "[a] general law would be one under which anyone could
[N]o person . . . [shell] take, directly or indirectly, for loan of any
monies, wares, merchandise, or other commodities whatsoever,
above the value of five pounds for the forbearance of one hundred
pounds for a year ...
See also Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. 115 (1861); 14 S. W.LimsToN, CoNTRACTs,
§ 1686 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1972).
130. 192 N.W.2d 699 (S.D. 1971).
131. Id. at 701.
132. See Sec. IIC supra.
133. See notes 79-81 and accompanying text supra.
134. Mont. Dist. Ct., No. 72647-C, May 22, 1972 [4 CCH CoNsUME
CREDIT GuIDE 99,181]. See also Stanton v. Mattson, 175 Neb. 767, 123
N.W.2d 844 (1963).
135. Cases cited notes 112 and 113 supra.
136. Cases cited note 107 supra.
137. Cecil v. Allied Stores Corp., Mont. Dist. Ct., No. 72647-C, May 22,
1972 [4 CCH CONSUMER CRiEDr GuIDE 99,181 at 89,087].
138. Id. The Montana Constitution provides that:
The legislative assembly shall not pass local or special laws in any
of the following enumerated cases, that is to siy: . .. regulating
the rate of interest on money .... In all cases where a general
law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted.
MONT. CONST. art. V, § 26.
sell personal property on installments on the same terms as any-
one else [and that] [t] here is no reasonable legislative basis to dis-
tinguish between retail sellers who sell on credit and other per-
sons who sell on credit.1u 9  The court concluded that the statu-
tory service charge was a special interest law since, "retail sellers
... exclusively [were] entitled to the rates of The Act.
140
V. APPLICATION OF THE MINORITY REASONING TO THE GOODS AND
SERVICES INSTALLIENT SALES ACT
A. Forbearance Invalidating the Time Price Doctrine
Whether such analysis is adaptable to the Pennsylvania situa-
tion is dubious. The jurisdictions which have invalidated the
time-price doctrine have done so after finding a charge for for-
bearance in excess of that allowed under their respective usury
laws.141 Pennsylvania's usury statute does not expressly cover
forbearance of a debt.1 42 The Pennsylvania courts, however, have
consistently held that forbearance is encompassed by the usury
statute. In Melnicoff v. Huber Investment Co. the court defined
usury in terms of forbearance143 and that case has been cited
with approval by various Pennsylvania courts on myriad occa-
sions.1
44
A second obstacle with regard to using forbearance to in-
validate the time-price doctrine is a court's natural inertia when
faced with overturning a well established common law doctrine.
Only five courts have been willing to treat a credit sale as a for-
bearance of an existing debt, thereby subjecting that sale to the
general interest law.145  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
never been faced with a direct challenge to the time-price doc-
trine, but in upholding the constitutionality of the Consumer Dis-
count Act the court stated:
Of course, all sales or lease contracts which extend credit
are, to a certain extent, akin to the making of loans, but
where a greater charge is exacted in the case of a sale or
credit than in a cash sale ... the extension of credit has
never been considered subject to the prohibition of usury.
146
139. Cecil v. Allied Stores Corp., Mont. Dist. Ct., No. 27647-C, May 22,
1972 [4 CCH CONSUMEa CREDIT GUIDE 99,181 at 89,092-03 (emphasis
added) ].
140. Id.
141. Cases cited notes 112 and 113 supra.
142. See note 18 supra. Forbearance was included in Pennsylvania's
first usury statute, the Usury Act of 1783, and was deleted only in later
versions of the usury statute. See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
143. 12 Pa. D. & C. 405, 407 (Phila. Munc. Ct. 1929).
144. Cases cited note 51 supra.
145. Cases cited notes 112 and 113 supra.
146. Equitable Credit & Discount Co. v. Geier, 342 Pa. 445, 455, 21
A.2d 53, 58 (1941).
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This dicta indicates that the court regarded the transaction as a
sale rather than an extension of credit or a loan, thereby foreclos-
ing the possibility of perceiving a forbearance in the transaction.
This eliminates the possibility of following the Montana court's
rationale in Cecil. 147 If the courts are unwilling to find a for-
bearance in a credit sale transaction, the GSISA cannot be chal-
lenged as a special interest rate law, since the basis transaction
the Act regulates, credit sales on revolving charge cards, could not
be considered within the domain of any interest law.
B. Constitutionality of the Goods and Services
Installment Sales Act
Alternatively, if Pennsylvania were to follow the logic of Wis-
consin v. J.C. Penney Co.148 and find the time-price doctrine no
longer tenable, the constitutionality of the GSISA would definitely
be open to challenge. The determinative portion of the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution is Article III, Section 32 which provides:
The General Assembly shall pass no local or special
law in any case which has been or can be provided for by
general law and specifically the General Assembly shall
not pass any local or special law:
[The eight specific prohibitions listed are not rele-
vant hereto] .149
This Section is an amended version of Article III, Section 7 of the
1874 Constitution which stated
The General Assembly shall not pass any local or spe-
cial law: . . . [f] ixing the rate of interest . . . [n] or shall
any law be passed granting powers or privileges in any
case where the granting of such powers and privileges
shall have been provided for by general law. .... 150
The old provision is almost identical to the one in the Montana Con-
stitution 51 used by the court in Cecil to overturn the Montana
statute regulating revolving charge accounts.
The amended Pennsylvania constitutional provision deletes a
number of specific prohibitions of the older version and inserts a
catch-all provision, i.e., the language preceding "and specifi-
cally." The express interdiction regarding interest rates was ex-
punged. The applicability of the analysis of the Cecil court,
52
147. See notes 134-40 and accompanying text supra.
148. 48 Wis. 2d 125, 179 N.W.2d 641 (1970). See notes 119-27 and
accompanying text supra.
149. PA. CONST. art. III, § 32.
150. PA. CoNsT. art. I, § 7 (1874).
151. See note 138 supra.
152. See notes 137-40 and accompanying text supra.
will thus also depend on the judicial determination of whether the
proscription of special interest rates is now encompassed by the
catch-all provision. If such special laws are no longer prohibited,
there is no constitutional basis upon which to attack the GSISA.
However, if such laws are covered by the new constitution, the
Act must be examined in light thereof.
The crucial factor in such an ex;amination is the definition of
"special law.1 53 In Pennsylvania a "special law" is one which, "is
restricted to particular persons or to an unreasonably narrow class
or interest."' 5 4 Thus, the prohibition applies only to distinctions
and classifications which are too restricted, not to general distinc-
tions and classifications. 15 5 This has been interpreted as requiring
only that the classification of objects or people for the purpose of
legislation be reasonable and be founded on genuine distinctions. 56
In determining whether there has been a violation of Article III,
Section Thirty-two, it has been stated:
Classification is a legislative question, subject to judicial
revision only so far as to see if it is founded on real, and
not merely artificial distinctions, and, if the distinctions
are genuine, the court cannot declare the classification
void, though they may not consider the basis sound. The
test is not wisdom, but good faith, in the classification.
15 7
Therefore, an act which applies to all members of a properly segre-
gated class is general and not special.15 However, "if the class
to which it applies is unnecessarily restricted or improperly se-
lected, the law is special, even though the subject of the legislation
is such that separate laws for separate classes is demanded."'15 9
Only a few cases160 have arisen pertaining to special interest
rate laws, and those were all under the 1874 Constitution which
153. See notes 138-40 and accompanying text supra for Montana's def-
inition of special law.
154. 34 PENNSYLVANIA LEGAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, Statutes § 31 (1960).
155. Harr v. Boucher, 142 Pa. Super. 114, 15 A.2d 699 (1940); Recent
cases, 96 U. PA. L. REV. 703, 703-04 (1948).
156. See, e.g., Bargain City U.S.A., Inc. v. Dilworth, 407 Pa. 129, 133,
179 A.2d 439, 442 (1962); Application of Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 233, 112 A.2d
625, 631, appeal dismissed sub nom., 350 U.S. 858 (1955); Mallinger v.
Pittsburgh, 316 Pa. 257, 260, 175 A. 525, 526 (1934); Harr v. Boucher, 142
Pa. Super. 114, 126-27, 15 A.2d 699, 705 (1940).
157. Commonwealth v. Puder, 261 Pa. 129, 135, 104 A. 505, 506 (1918).
Cited in Application of Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 233, 112 A.2d 625, 631, appeal
dismissed sub nom., 350 U.S. 858 (1955); Equitable Credit & Discount Co.
v. Geier, 342 Pa. 445, 449, 21 A.2d 53, 55 (1941). See Ashworth v. Pitts-
burgh Rys Co., 231 Pa. 539, 542-44, 80 A. 981, 982-83 (1911) for a thorough
compilation of old tests used in Pennsylvania.
158. See, e.g., Heuchert v. State Harness Racing Comm'n, 403 Pa.
440, 446-47, 170 A.2d 332, 336 (1961); Dufour v. Maize, 358 Pa. 309, 313,
56 A.2d 675, 677 (1948); Seabolt v. Comm'rs of Northumberland County,
187 Pa. 318, 323, 41 A. 22, 23 (1898).
159. Chalmers v. Philadelphia, 250 Pa. 251, 256, 95 A. 427, 429 (1915).
160. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Perkins, 342 Pa. 529, 21 A.2d 45,
aff'd, 314 U.S. 586 (1941); Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives & Granting
Annuities v. Philadelphia, 262 Pa. 439, 105 A. 630 (1918).
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specifically prohibited such special laws. 61 On the assumption
that the restriction still exists in the new constitution, 1 2 a brief
summary of three Pennsylvania cases is appropriate. In Pennsyl-
vania Co. for Insurance on Lives & Granting Annuities v. Philadel-
phia,6 3 the Act of June 1, 1915164 was declared unconstitutional
as a special interest law. The Act provided:
That in all cases where private property is taken, in-
jured, or destroyed by municipal corporations invested
with the privilege of taking private property for public
use, the damages caused by such taking, injury, or destruc-
tion shall bear interest, at the rate of six per centum per
annum, from the date of such taking, injury, or destruc-
tion thereof. 6 5
This was held to be a special interest rate law because, "it ap-
plie [d] to municipalities only, and not to all public and quasi-pub-
lic corporations invested with the power of eminent domain."' 66
On the other hand, in Commonwealth v. Perkins, 6 the classifica-
tion of the Unemployment Compensation Law 6" was upheld. Sec-
tions 308 and 309 of the Law required that employer contributions,
unpaid on the date when they were due, were to bear interest at the
rate of one per cent per month. 69 Since the statute applied to all
employers it was determined to be a general rather than special
law.'7 0  Finally, in Chalmers v. Philadelphia,171 an act providing
for the examination and licensing of engineers in charge of steam
boilers, steam engines, and appliances connected therewith,
72
was declared unconstitutional. The Act was regarded as special,
because it only applied to part of a class, expressly excluding en-
gineers operating small boilers and engines. 78
When the GSISA is scrutinized in light of the foregoing, the
classification of those entitled to the Act's benefits could be
161. See note 150 and accompaning text supra.
162. See note 149 and accompanying text supra.
163. 262 Pa. 439, 105 A. 630 (1918).
164. PA. LAWS 685 (1915) (Unconstitutional-1918); see note 163 and
accompanying text supra.
165. Id. (emphasis added).
166. Pennsylvania for Ins. on Lives & Granting Annuities v. Phila-
delphia, 262 Pa. 439, 442, 105 A. 630, 631 (1918).
167. 342 Pa. 529, 21 A.2d 45, aff'd, 314 U.S. 586 (1941).
168. Act of Dec. 5, 1936, PA. LAWS 2897 (1937), as amended, PA. STAT,
ANN. tit. 43, §§ 751-881 (1971).
169. Commonwealth v. Perkins, 342 Pa. 529, 535, 21 A.2d 45, 49, aff'd,
314 U.S. 586 (1941).
170. Id.
171. 250 Pa. 251, 95 A. 427 (1915).
172. Act of April 18, 1899, PA. LAws 49 (1899) (Unconstitutional-1915;
see note 171 and accompanying text supra).
173. Calmers v. Philadelphia, 250 Pa. 251, 254-45, 95 A. 427, 428 (1915).
deemed too restrictive.'1 4 The Act authorizes only retail sellers 75
to collect interest at the rate of one and one-quarter per cent
per month. 17 6 As pointed out in Cecil v. Allied Stores Corp.,1"7 the
benefit of the higher interest rate inures to retail sellers who sell
on credit, to the exclusion of other persons selling on credit. Man-
ufacturers, distributors and individuals sell items of personal
property on credit but they are limited to an interest charge of six
per cent under the general interest law. The Cecil court rejected
the argument that retail sellers, in and of themselves, constituted
a general class due to the special credit risks they take, 17 ruling
that "any seller of personal property is confronted with the same
problem of credit risk; it is not a hazard limited to retail install-
ment sales.'
1 79
It is submitted that this is a flaw in the court's analysis.
Though in theory the risk is the same, the available means of pro-
tecting against such risks are not equal and therefore, in the final
analysis, the risks of retail sellers are clearly distinguishable as
being greater. This is due to the fact that if the seller attempts to
protect his credit risk by entering into a security agreement with
the purchaser,' 0 the nature of a retail seller's collateral is differ-
ent than that of the manufacturer or distributor. The manufac-
turer selling to a merchant can take a security interest over the
buyer's inventory,'8 ' which may include after acquired goods.'8 2
In the event of the merchant's default, the manufacturer may re-
possess the remaining inventory. 83 On the other hand, the mer-
chant honoring his own credit card takes only a purchase money
security interest in the goods being sold. 84 Such goods are typi-
174. See notes 137-40 and accompanying text supra.
175. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1201 (3) provides:
"Retail Seller" or "seller" means a person engaged in the business
of selling goods or furnishing services to retail buyers.
176. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1904 provides:
[T]he seller or holder of a retail installment account may charge,
receive and collect the service charge authorized by this act.
The service charge shall not exceed the following rates computed
on the outstanding balances from month to month:
177. Mont. Dist. Ct., No. 72647-C, May 22, 1972 [4 CCH CONSUMER
CREDIT GUIDE 99,181 at 89,093].
178. Id. [ 99,181 at 89,092].
179. Id. [ 99,181 at 89,096].
180. The transaction would be covered by Article Nine of the UNTFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE which Pennsylvania has enacted as PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12A, §§ 9-101 to -507 (1953).
181. PA. STAT. ANN, tit. 12A, §§ 9-201, -203, and -204 (1953).
182. Id. § 9-204.
183. Id. § 9-503.
184. See note 12 supra. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-107 (1953)
defining a purchase money security interest as follows:
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the
extent that it is
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure
all or part of its price; or
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring
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cally non-durable "soft" having a short useful life. Therefore, if
the buyer defaults on his payments, the retail seller's right to re-
possess the "soft" goods is not comparable to the manufacturer's
right to repossess inventory, since the "soft" goods would have
little or no resale value.
Furthermore, the only way for the merchant to protect his in-
terest in the collateral in the event of a subsequent resale of the
collateral to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the
encumbrance is to file a financing statement. 8 5 However, the
cost of perfecting each purchase money security interest, i.e. each
credit card transaction, by filing'8 6 would be prohibitive. The
manufacturer, on the other hand, need file only one financing
statement covering the buyer's inventory and this is sufficient
protection against resale. Therefore, the store honoring its own
credit card is not protected as well as a manufacturer under Ar-
ticle Nine. Nor is a bank credit card transaction protected equally,
since the arrangement is not even covered by Article Nine.
18 7
In Pennsylvania the fact that retail sellers bear a greater risk,
due to the different type of collateral involved in their sales, may
be enough to warrant their classification as a general group for
legislative purposes. This conclusion is based on the holding in
Equitable Credit & Discount Co. v. Geier.188 There, the constitu-
tionality of the Consumer Discount Company Act'8 9 was chal-
lenged as a denial of equal protection of the laws resulting from
discrimination between different types of lending institutions. The
Act regulated the making of loans of less than one thousand dol-
lars, however, banking institutions, building and loan associa-
tions, credit unions and persons or corporations licensed under
the Small Loans Act of 1915190 were exempted.' 9' In upholding
the statute, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that, "[t] hese
exempted institutions . . . differ from consumer discount com-
panies in various ways, notably in the kind of collateral upon
an obligation gives value to enable the debtor to acquire
rights in or the use of collateral if such value is in fact
so used.
185. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-307(2) (1953).
186. Id. § 9-403.
187. Davenport, Bank Credit Cards and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 1 VAL. L. REV. 218, 240-41 (1967).
188. 342 Pa. 445, 21 A.2d 53 (1941).
189. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 761-19 (1937), as amended, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 7, § 6201-19 (Supp. 1972).
190. Act of June 17, 1915, PA. LAWS 1012 (1915), as amended, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 7, § 6151-57 (1967).
191. Act cited note 189 supra.
which their loans are ordinarily made."192 The GSISA establishes
retail sellers as a class and confers upon them the privilege of
charging a one and one-quarter per cent per month service charge.
Following Geier and accepting the premise that retail sellers ex-
tend credit on a different kind of collateral than other sellers, the
retail sellers can legitimately be distinguished as a proper object
of legislation under Article III, Section Thirty-two since the classi-
fication is based on a genuine distinction.
CONCLUSION
The time-price doctrine had its origins in the 19th century
and was developed to exempt the one time only type credit sale.198
Today, the time-price doctrine is accepted in the vast majority of
American jurisdictions and is well established in Pennsylvania. 94
Problems aries, however, in the application of the 19th Century so-
lution to the 20th Century problem of the amount of interest to
be charged on revolving charge accounts.
The shortcomings of the time-price doctrine are evidenced in
three specific areas.195  First, the mechanics of the revolving
charge are so radically different from that of a time sale, that
the entire doctrine seems inapplicable. This is based primarily on
the fact that it is impossible to quote a time price to the purchaser
at the time of purchase in a charge account sale. This is a pre-
requisite to the time-price doctrine. Secondly, a service charge
should be a charge for services rendered in connection with a
time-price sale. When the service charge includes a charge for the
extension of credit, as under the GSISA, the charge is really inter-
est. Finally, it can be argued that there is no difference between
a credit sale and a loan, and therefore the grounds for the time-
price doctrine are obviated.
Five courts have found these problems to be sufficient reason
to invalidate the time-price doctrine, at least as it applies to re-
volving charge accounts. 96 These courts have found a forbear-
ance in the revolving charge transaction, bringing it under the
usury laws regulating interest charged on loans and forbearances.
One court has not only abrogated the common law, time-price doc-
trine, but has also held the statutory codification of the doctrine
unconstitutional as a special law.
197
The three above mentioned problems arise with the time-price
doctrine in Pennsylvania. However, and apparently by happen-
192. Equitable Credit & Discount Co. v. Geier, 342 Pa. 445, 454, 21
A.2d 53, 57 (1941).
193. See generally Sec. IIB supra.
194. See Sec. IHC supra.
195. See generally Sec. III supra.
196. See generally Sec. IVB supra.
197. Cecil v. Allied Stores Corp., Mont. Dist. Ct., No. 72647-C, May 22,
1972 [4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GuIDE 99,181].
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stance, Pennsylvania has evaded the two bases upon which the
doctrine has been overturned in other states.
98 First, neither the
general usury statute nor the constitution of Pennsylvania use
the word forbearance in discussing usurious rates of interest. In
order for the court to find a prohibition against usurious charges
for forbearing on a debt, it must do so on the basis of case law.
Melnicoff establishes such a prohibition. On the other hand, the
Geier decision indicates a strong disinclination toward finding a
forbearance in a time-price sale, deeming the transaction a sale
rather than a loan. This precludes ruling the GSISA unconstitu-
tional as a special interest rate law, since the Act would be reg-
ulating a sale rather than a loan or forbearance and therefore the
statutory service charge could not be considered interest.
Even if a Pennsylvania court invalidates the common law
time-price doctrine by finding a forbearance, the statutory ex-
pansion of that doctrine under the GSISA would still be valid and
the argument that the Act is unconstitutional is tenuous at best.
There are two reasons for this. First, there is a question as to
whether special interest rate laws are still prohibited under the
1967 Pennsylvania Constitution. Second, if such a prohibition still
exists, the Act's classification of retail sellers as a general class
may be valid due to the different nature of their collateral.
Finally, two other facts militate in favor of upholding the
GSISA. First, the five jurisdictions which overturned the time-
price doctrine all had general usury laws setting the interest rate
between ten and twelve per cent per annum.199 The economic
feasibility of operating a revolving credit account under such rates
is much greater than operating under Pennsylvania's six per cent
per annum limitation. Since, neither raising the general interest
rate, nor extinguishing installment buying by subjecting it to the
six percent limit is desirable, the GSISA should be upheld. Sec-
ondly, the GSISA limits the service charge to one and one-fourth
per cent per month (15% per annum) while the vast majority of
other state regulating revolving charge accounts establish the rate
at one and one-half per cent per month (18% per annum) .200 There-
fore, under the GSISA, the citizenry of Pennsylvania is among
the best protected of those jurisdictions upholding the time-price
doctrine.
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198. See generally Sec. V supra.
199. B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDrr LFGISLATION at 15 (1965).
See also 1 CCH CONSUMER CREDrr Gum 510.
200. 1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 630 (Three states: Conn., Minn.,
and Wash. limit the monthly charges to 1% per month).
